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Abstract 
Previous research finds market financing is favored over relationship financing in environments of better 
governance, since the transaction costs to investors of vetting asymmetric information are thereby reduced. 
For industries supplying public goods, for-profits rely on market financing, while nonprofits rely on 
relationships with donors. This suggests that for-profits will be more inclined than nonprofits to improve 
financial transparency. We examine the impact of for-profit versus nonprofit status on the financial 
transparency of firms engaged with supplying public goods. There are relatively few industries that have 
large number of both for-profit and nonprofit firms across countries. However, the microfinance industry 
provides the opportunity of a large number of both for-profit and nonprofit firms in relatively equal 
numbers, across a wide array of countries. Consistent with our prediction, we find that financial 
transparency is positively associated with a for-profit status. Results will be of broad interest both to 
scholars interested in the roles of transparency and transaction costs on market versus relational financing; 
as well as to policy makers interested in the impact of for-profit on the supply of public goods, and on the 
microfinance industry in particular. 
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Over the past several decades, there has been a widely noted trend for commercialization of 
nonprofit activities (Guo,2006; Hammack and Young, 1993; Weisbrod, 1998; Schiff and Weisbrod, 1991). 
This trend is often attributed to declining government support of nonprofits along with concomitant 
difficulty in increasing private donations. Foster and Bradach (2005) note that nonprofits increasingly feel 
compelled to both seek new revenue sources as well as to appear more disciplined and businesslike to 
stakeholders. These difficulties present opportunities for competition by for-profits. However, issues 
consequently emerge about whether the private sector facilitates the supply of respective public goods of 
appropriate quality (Easley and O'Hara, 1983; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). Within this context, 
transparency in all forms increases in importance. Transparency is widely seen as vital to trust building. 
Concomitantly, it is vital for nonprofits to establish trust with donors (Weisbrod, 1975; Kingma, 1997), 
while for-profits supplying public goods need to establish trust with shareholders as well as with a variety 
of stakeholders. Further, regarding for-profit firms, Mazboudi and Hasan (2018) evidence the importance 
of transparency for corporate investment efficiency. 
This paper investigates how the difference between nonprofit and for-profit status impacts financial 
transparency of firms supplying public goods. Do levels of financial transparency differ between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations? How do country-level factors condition the role of profit status in impacting 
financial transparency? These questions deserve more attention. However, one problem that arises in 
seeking to answer these questions is that there are few industries that have large numbers of both for-profit 
and nonprofit firms across a wide array of countries. Studies of nonprofits have typically focused on select 
industries in the USA, particularly hospitals, daycare, museums, universities, home health care, social 
services, and broadcasting (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990). However, unlike the settings of previous studies, 
microfinance has a large number of both for-profit and nonprofit firms in relatively equal numbers, across 
a wide array of countries. This allows for additionally investigating the role of national characteristics in 




Further, in addition to considering the importance for policy makers of the role of for-profits in 
traditionally public goods sectors like microfinance1, an important impetus for our investigation is to 
consider this study in comparison to papers from international finance that discuss markets versus 
relationship financing (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009a; Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009b; Ergungor, 2004; 
Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Goodell and Goyal, 2018). These papers find that market financing is favored 
over relationship financing under conditions that market financing lowers the transaction costs of vetting 
asymmetric information. Such reduction of transaction costs can be the result of better legal and governance 
environments, or because of cultures that encourage greater social trust or comfort with uncertainty.  
In this study, investigating an international sample of for-profit and nonprofit microfinance 
institutions, we consider that for-profits compared to nonprofits are inherently biased towards market 
finance. For-profits either use market finance or have the option to use it. Nonprofits, on the other hand, 
rely significantly on relationship financing via large donors. Thus, considering previous research on bank 
versus market financing, we expect for-profits to elect for greater levels of volitional transparency. While 
previous research finds that, all else equal, countries with better governance are more inclined towards 
market financing, an investigation on a broad international sample of for-profits and nonprofits allows for 
testing whether firms will adjust their levels of volitional transparency based on the typical nature of their 
financing. We hypothesize that for-profit MFIs will maintain higher levels of financial transparency than 
nonprofits. Consistent with our prediction, we evidence for a broad sample of microfinance institutions, 
across a wide variety of countries, that financial transparency is positively associated with a for-profit status.  
Our study uses the transparency score of MIX Market (mixmarket.org) database. Using data on 977 
MFIs from 41 countries (4,499 MFI-years observations) for a 13-year period (2003–2015); and controlling 
for relevant MFI-level and country-specific factors, we investigate the impact of for-profit status on MFI 
financial transparency. We evidence that transparency is positively associated with a for-profit status. 
Results will be of broad interest both to scholars interested in the roles of transparency and transaction costs 
                                                 




on market versus relational financing; as well as to policy makers interested in the impact of for-profits on 
the supply of public goods, and on the microfinance industry in particular. 
2. Background and hypothesis 
2.1 The financing distinction between for-profits and nonprofits 
We consider that a fundamental difference between for-profit and nonprofit suppliers of public 
goods is not so much due to a difference in objective as a difference in financing. Nonprofits are 
increasingly under pressure to meet financial operating benchmarks, not just success at supplying of public 
goods. For-profits, by nature of operating in a public-goods supplying industries will face enhanced scrutiny 
regarding how the supply of the respective public good is impacted by their presence. A fundamental 
difference, however, between nonprofit and for-profit suppliers of public goods is the nature of their 
financing. While for-profits rely on market financing, nonprofits rely on relationships with donors. For-
profit firms may also access relationship financing through banks. However, with regard to for-profits, there 
is always the potential for further market financing. The relationship of nonprofits to their financing sources 
are inherently more personal. One can switch banks, but important large donors are much less likely to be 
readily substituted.  
2.1.1 The evolving role of nonprofits 
For some time, there has been a widely noted trend around the globe for commercialization of 
nonprofit activities (Guo, 2006; Hammack and Young, 1993; Weisbrod, 1998). Commercialism in this 
context closely relates to the degree of reliance on sales revenues rather than donations or government 
grants (James, 1998). Schiff and Weisbrod (1991) attribute this trend towards a for-profit model to declining 
support from governments and inability to increase donations. Foster and Bradach (2005) note that 
nonprofits increasingly feel compelled to both seek new revenue sources as well as to appear more 
disciplined and businesslike to stakeholders, in part by reducing their reliance on fundraising.  
One consequence, as well as cause, of the financial pressure on nonprofits is increasing competition 




as a consequence, issues emerge about whether the private sector facilitates the supply of public goods of 
appropriate quality (Easley and O'Hara, 1983; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). With respect to universities, for 
instance, are educational degrees from for-profit institutions in the US of equal value to those from 
nonprofits (Goodell, 2016)? This paper does not address directly this latter question. However, comparing 
the transparency of for-profits and nonprofits has important ramifications for a wide variety of 
considerations as various debates with inevitably be based on available public information. 
While transparency overall is a vital topic (Forssbaeck and Oxelheim, 2014), the behavior, 
including disclosure behavior, of sectors that stand outside markets have long been interesting to social 
science (Kingma, 1997). This extends to considering the need of nonprofits for transparency. As nonprofits 
in general are suppliers of public goods, providing information about the value of goods is itself a public 
good. As nonprofits exist to provide public goods (Weisbrod, 1975), quality of information is amongst other 
signals that indicate the quality of these goods (Kingma, 1997). As an extension, quality of information is 
vital to citizens, regulators and firm-specific stakeholders assessing the long-run prospects of nonprofits, 
and alternatively for-profits, to supply necessary public goods. 
In the model of Weisbrod (1975), nonprofit organizations satisfy a demand for public goods which 
is left unfilled by government provision. For a particular public good, the government provides to the level 
demanded by the median voter. However, some citizens have a level of demand for this good that is greater 
than the median voter's. This unfilled demand for the public good is satisfied by nonprofit organizations. 
Concomitantly these nonprofit organizations are financed by the donations of those respective citizens who 
want an increase in the output of the public good.  
DiMaggio and Anheier (1990) summarize that industries particularly suited to being nonprofits will 
include industries where firms cannot make informed choices. This is because 1) donors buy services for 
third parties which are not directly known; such as overseas charities, 2) consumers of public goods are 
often less able to attest to service quality (daycare centers, mental hospitals), 3) donations cannot be tracked 
to specific services (pooled political donations for political advocacy), or 4) services are so complex that 




(medical care) (see also Hansman, 1980; Easley and O'Hara, 1983; Easley and O'Hara, 1988; Chau and 
Huysentruyt, 2006). Weisbrod (1988) suggests that nonprofits emerge in order to provide high-quality 
services that have special attributes that are difficult to evaluate. Alternatively, Hansman (1981) emphasizes 
voluntary price discrimination through donations for those few industries (e.g., theatres, universities) in 
which services are consumed by purchasers who are able to assess their quality. Incentives, stakeholders, 
agency concerns, claims on residual earnings, and relationships with the public sector are all potential 
differences between nonprofit organizations and for-profit firms that operate in industries that are not 
supplying pubic goods (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). These differences naturally extend to disclosure and 
transparency (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman, 2002).  
However, in this study we are comparing nonprofits with for-profits that specifically supply public 
goods in the same industry. Many of the differences outlined by previous research, between for-profits and 
nonprofits, are based on the view that nonprofts and for-profits are operating in differing industries. 
However, examining a broad sample of both nonprofits and for-profits operating in the same industry, 
allows a clearer picture of how differences in financing impact differences in financial transparency. As 
noted by Speckbacher (2008), with regard to nonprofit governance versus for-profit governance, suppliers 
of financing to nonprofits typical do so without the protection of a comprehensive contract, as so rely on 
the strength of relationships.  
2.2.2 For-profits or nonprofits: Which values transparency more? 
Research affirms the value of disclosure to investors. (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Barth, Levine, 
and Caprio, 2008; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Kothari, Li, and Short, 2009; and Leuz and Verrechia, 2000). 
However, there are reasons to suggest that there will be greater discretionary transparency amongst 
nonprofits. According to the website of the National Council of Nonprofits,2 “charitable nonprofits embrace 
the values of accountability and transparency as a matter of ethical leadership, as well as legal compliance. 
Leaders of charitable nonprofits know that financial transparency will help preserve the very important trust 
                                                 




each donor places in a nonprofit with each contribution.” Nevertheless, we argue that financial transparency 
will be more important to for-profit firms rather than nonprofit firms because of the well-known finding 
that transparency is more important for market financing than for relationship financing. We consider this 
alongside the fact that nonprofits inherently rely on relationships with donors, while for-profits either 
engage in market financing will consider the option value of being able to engage with market financing. 
As noted by Coase (1960), in a theoretically ideal financial system it would make no difference 
whether financing was privately done through relationships or publicly through markets. However, in an 
imperfect society other factors must also be considered. According to North (1990), the costliness of 
information needed for measurement and enforcement of exchanges creates “transaction costs.” 
Transaction costs involve costs of defining property rights and costs of enforcing contracts—including costs 
of information. “Transformation costs” are the costs associated with using technology and the efficiency of 
factor and product markets and are reflected in transaction costs. Whether institutions lower or raise overall 
transaction costs have to do in part with the ability of participants to be informed and to understand the 
nature of the particular institutional environment. This includes not just understanding the nature of 
contracts and their enforceability, but also the temperament and motivation of other participants.  
Transaction costs are an inherent part of market transactions. As noted by Williamson (1988) when 
the costs of market exchange are sufficiently high, firms can obtain cheaper financing through some other 
means. The alternative to market financing is typically through some sort of a prescribed arrangement, such 
as a bank loan or, more broadly, through a prescribed transfer of resources through a horizontal or vertical 
network. Hart (2001) and Hart (1995) note that the primary transaction costs of market exchanges stem 
from the uncertainties of contracts. From the point of view of the equity investor, obtaining reliable 
information about firms is innately costly and, to some degree, fallible. These costs will be shared with the 
supplier of equity, causing equity financing to be more costly for the firm. 
As noted by Modigliani and Perotti (1998), and earlier by Rajan (1992), it is where contract 
enforcement is weak that collateral is more emphasized, leading to an advantage for bank financing. 




an informational advantage for banks that they can charge excessively high interest rates. In other words, 
lowering the cost of equity financing, is important even for for-profit firms electing to finance through 
banks. 
The cost of market finance, for for-profit firms, is determined by the lessening of asymmetry of 
information. The cost of market financing will shape the cost of financing for firms whether or not they are 
engaging at the moment with seeking market financing. There is a large body of literature that finds that 
societies with less transparency and less governance or less tolerance of information asymmetry will have 
greater costs of market financing (e.g., Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009a; Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009b; 
Ergungor, 2004; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006). 
We hypothesize, therefore, that transparency is likely more important for for-profits.  
H1: For-profits will maintain better levels of financial transparency than nonprofits 
2.4 Microfinance as a platform for investigating transparency 
The goal of this study is to investigate the impact of profit status on financial transparency for firms 
supplying public goods in general, rather uncover evidence that is only relevant to the microfinance 
industry. However, investigating a broader sample of all sorts of different nonprofit industries across a 
broad number of countries would present other challenges. Many nonprofit industries, such as hospitals and 
universities, would not be represented in anything close to equal numbers of for-profits and nonprofits in 
respective countries. This would open the potential for confounding country-level effects of culture and 
governance with differences due to industry.  
A focus on microfinance in particular affords a number of opportunities. First, there is considerable 
data available at the MFI level internationally which extends over a large number of countries. Second, for 
some developing countries, MFI-level data may include many more institutions than there are publicly 
traded firms in these markets. Third, MFIs are present in a wide variety of developing countries, which 




countries are typically both for-profit and nonprofit. Therefore, a focus on microfinance affords an 
opportunity to investigate how transparency is impacted by the distinction between for-profit and nonprofit 
institutions and whether this distinction has an interactive impact along with aspects of the institutional 
environment. Fifth, the role of institutions in shaping governance mechanism has recently been studied with 
a focus on corporate social responsibility. The mission and outreach elements of microfinance are similar 
in nature to those of corporate social responsibility and this study therefore offers an extension into this 
area of investigation (Brammer, Jackson, and Matten, 2012). 
Augustine (2012) notes that past research on the governance of MFIs (e.g., Mersland and Strøm, 
2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2009) focus on agency issues. Beisland and Mersland (2014) examine the 
determinants of differences in earnings quality between for-profit and nonprofit MFIs. However, they find 
insignificant differences. Mori and Mersland (2014) show that differences amongst stakeholders who sit on 
boards, such as donors, customers, employees and creditors significantly influence microfinance 
organizations. They also find that nonprofit MFIs have more donors on board than for-profit organizations, 
while customers and employees have a greater stakeholder presence for for-profit organizations. Roberts 
(2013) finds that a for-profit status is associated with higher interest rates for MFI clients, but also higher 
MFI costs. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2011) find that for-profits differ from nonprofits in the 
manner of absorbing costs of regulation: for-profits cut back on outreach to maintain profitability, while 
nonprofits allow themselves to be less profitable. Duqi and Torluccio (2015); Servin, Lensink, and van den 
Berg (2012) and others examine how different ownership identities, such as shareholders, banks, social 
investors, government entities, and institutional investors, impact the risk and performance of MFIs. Mori 
and Mersland (2014) find that differences in stakeholders leads to differences in the nature and focus of 
governing boards and also levels of financial and social performance. While both nonprofits and for-profits 
arguably have many stakeholders, the distinction between donor financing and market financing is a stark 




We control for firm-level MFI characteristics including profitability, portfolio quality and 
efficiency as well as level of outreach.3 As noted by Bhojraj, Blacconiere, and Souza (2004), volitional 
transparency is a function of conflicting incentives among various stakeholders. Literature certainly affirms 
this is the case for microfinance as well. Studying the disclosure of for-profit versus nonprofit MFIs affords 
a particular opportunity to investigate the distinction of for-profit versus nonprofit status as a determinant 
of disclosure. 
3. Methodology and data description 
3.1 Dependent variable 
We use data from MIX Market’s assessment of MFI transparency (TRANSPARENCY). The MIX 
Market transparency score (labeled diamonds in their dataset) is assigned an integer 0–5, with 5 being most 
transparent. Currently, each profile on the site receives an overall diamond profile score, and an annual 
score for each full year of data that are published on the site.4 A diamond score of “1” is assigned if the 
MFI is considered to have a visible profile. A diamond score of “2” is assigned if the MFI reports some 
data on products and clients for the year. A diamond score of “3” is assigned if there is additionally some 
reporting of financial data by the MFI. A diamond score of “4” is assigned if, in addition to the items listed 
above, MFI also publishes audited financial statements for the year. A diamond score of “5” is assigned if 
the MFI also publishes a due diligence report for the financial year. 
Since, MFIs self-report to MIX Market, out of concern for sample bias, we drop MFI years with a 
diamond score of “0.” In our remaining sample, we have 1066 MFI-years with a diamond score of 1; 193 
MFI-years with a diamond score of 2; 725 MFI-years with a diamond score of 3; 1915 MFI-years with a 
diamond score of 4; and 600 MFI-years with a diamond score of 5. 
Table 1 shows the country averages in our sample, ranked according to transparency. Also shown 
in this table, are the number of MFIs and the MFI years per country, as well as the relative numbers of for-
                                                 
3 We do consider that such firm-level estimates may be less than fully accurate for firms with concomitantly less 
transparency. However, results regarding the associating of levels of transparency with firm-level performance are not 
the crux of this study. 




profit versus nonprofit transparency and MFI years used in this study. Examining Table 1, we find that 
transparency varies widely across our broad sample of MFIs of 41 countries. The country with the best 
transparency, perhaps surprisingly, is Panama (4.29). Ecuador (4.03), followed by India (3.82) and 
Honduras (3.79) also rank relatively high in terms of transparency score. India has the most MFIs per 
country (132 out of 977), representing 13.5% of our total sample. In general, the transparency of MFIs from 
Caribbean and Latin American countries seems to be relatively high (more than 3.5), while MFIs in Eastern 
Europe and African countries seem to exhibit relatively lower transparency (less than 2.4). 
(Please insert Table 1 about here) 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Our sample consists of 977 MFIs. The data is an unbalanced panel data consisting of 4,499 MFI–
years from 41 emerging countries, over a sample period of thirteen years from 2003–2015. Table 2 provides 
a summary of the dependent and independent variables used in this study. Together, these independent 
variables reflect the influences that could affect MFI predilection for transparency. Overall, the independent 
variables used in this study reflect fund financial characteristics, fund mission characteristics, national 
institutions, macroeconomic factors and national culture. The summary statistics in Table 2 reflect a 
reasonably even distribution of for-profit and nonprofit MFIs in our sample. Since 45% (55%) of our sample 
consists of for-profit (nonprofit) MFIs, our dataset is not biased towards a specific type of MFIs. Also, in 
our sample 50% of MFIs accept deposits, have an average age between 5–8 years, and on average extend 
credit to circa 10,000 borrowers. The correlation matrix (Appendix) indicates there is little collinearity 
among the explanatory variables. 
(Please insert Table 2 about here) 
3.3 Statistical specification and estimation 
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where TRANSPARENCY is the MFI-level year-specific transparency score. FOR_PROFIT is a dummy 
variable that is assigned the value one when the MFI is for-profit and zero otherwise. MFI_CONTROLS is 
a vector of MFI-level variables that include the important dimensions of MFIs: efficiency, portfolio quality, 
and profitability as well as an array of other MFI-level factors. NATIONAL_GOVERNANCE is a collection 
of six national governance parameters from the World Bank. BANK_REGULATION aggregates variables 
specific to banking regulation from Barth, Levine, and Caprio (2008) and then further is aggregated with a 
dummy variable that is assigned 1 if MFI is subject to banking regulation and 0 otherwise.  
In our initial tables, we estimate standard errors clustered at the MFI level. Due to the nature of our 
dependent variable, which can take on values from 1–5 (MFI-years with diamonds of 0 dropped), we report 
the results of ordered logit regressions with errors clustered at the MFI level. Because of the nature of these 
tests, year dummies are included in models using ordered logit but not in models using generalized ordered 
logit. Variance inflation factors for all the regression coefficients across all the models is less than 10. 
In other tables we investigate whether our models satisfy the parallel lines assumption (Brant, 
1990). We also control for endogeneity with the procedure of Kripfganz and Schwarz (2019). This 
procedure is a sequential approach to estimating a dynamic Hausman–Taylor model, which first estimates 
the coefficients of the time-varying regressors and subsequently regresses the first-stage residuals on the 
time-invariant regressors.  
3.4 Independent variables 
3.4.1 Primary independent variables 
Our primary independent variable of interest is a dummy variable that is assigned “1” if an MFI is 
for-profit and “0” otherwise (FOR_PROFIT). The source for this variable is MIX Market.  
Additionally, in this study, we investigate the role of profit status on conditioning the impact of 




We include a country-level governance parameter to explain MFI-level voluntary self-disclosure. 
NATIONAL_GOVERNANCE is the first principal component score of the six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, namely, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. We also include as an 
independent variable the interaction of national governance and profit status 
(FOR_PROFIT*NATIONAL_GOVERNANCE). We include this interaction variable to assess whether a 
for-profit status influences the impact of governance on transparency.5 
As noted by Aguilera et al. (2008), agency conflict takes on very different forms across countries, 
not only due to different patterns of shareholder concentration but based on differing constructs of complex 
social networks that can be significantly impacted by a wide variety of aspects. Evidence shows that 
transparency, as with governance mechanisms in general, varies across countries. For instance, Berglöf and 
Pajuste (2005) show that disclosure levels vary substantially across firms and there is a strong country effect 
in the deviation between actual and required disclosure. As with governance in general, disclosure levels 
are expected to reflect complex sets of incentives (Berglöf and Pajuste (2005); Bushman, Piotroski, and 
Smith (2004)).  
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004), Jacoby et al. (2019) and others evidence association of 
country-level factors with corporate transparency, however this evidence is mixed. For instance, Bushman, 
Piotroski, and Smith (2004) find a positive association of firm-level financial transparency with national 
governance, while Jacoby et al. (2019) find a negative association, or substitution of firm-level transparency 
for governance voids, across a sample of emerging markets. 
We control whether the financial transparency of MFIs varies as well with national governance and 
other country-level factors, with a focus on whether national governance impact the role of for-profit versus 
nonprofit status on transparency. The role of nonprofit organizations in society is also impacted by the role 
of the private sector and the state and consequently by national governance (Boris and Steuerle, 2006). 
                                                 




Civil-law countries are seen at times as having great state involvement in the nonprofit sector, with 
nonprofits in common-law countries having more market-oriented characteristics (Esping-Andersen, 
1990).Therefore, in this study we control for national governance and legal origin. We also examine 
whether national governance influences the impact of for-profit versus nonprofit status on transparency. 
3.4.2 MFI controls 
Following von Stauffenberg et al. (2003) regarding MFI financial characteristics, we include MFI 
controls based on four fundamental MFI qualities 1) portfolio quality or portfolio risk, 2) efficiency and 
productivity, 3) financial management, and 4) profitability. For portfolio quality (PORTFOLIO_QLTY), we 
use the first principal component of portfolio at risk for 90 days, the write-off ratio, negative of provision 
expense ratio, and negative of the risk coverage from MIX Market. The provision expense ratio is the 
provision for loan impairment divided by gross loan portfolio. Risk coverage is impairment loss allowance 
divided by 30-day portfolio at risk. For efficiency and productivity (EFFICIENCY), we use the first 
principal component of the operating expense ratio, cost per borrower, personnel productivity, and loan 
officer productivity. We use the debt-to-equity ratio and label it as LEVERAGE. For profitability 
(PROFITABILITY), we use the first principal component of return on equity, return on assets, and portfolio 
yield.  
In terms of additional control variables, we account for MFI age (AGE). AGE is a categorical 
variable that is assigned “1” if the MFI is 1–4 years old, “2” if the MFI is 5–8 years old, and “3”, if MFI is 
older than 8-years-old.6 We include an independent variable as a measure of the degree of outreach 
(OUTREACH_SIZE), from MIX Market. This variable is assigned an integer 0–2, with “2” being the 
highest level of outreach. Outreach is proxied by the number of borrowers, with “2” being assigned if the 
number of borrowers is greater than 30,000, “1” if it is between 10,000–30,000, and “0” if less than 10,000.7 
                                                 
6 AGE is reported as a categorical variable by MIX Market dataset. 
7 OUTREACH_SIZE is correlated about 0.60 with the natural log of the size of assets for the MFI. Therefore, we do 
not include the size of assets in our regressions. However, we also run all the regressions controlling for the size of 
MFI assets (natural logarithm) and the results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. They are available from the 




The dummy variable DEPOSITS is assigned “1” if the MFI accepts deposits and “0” otherwise. The dummy 
variable TARGET is assigned “1” if the borrowers of the MFI are high-end or broad businesses and “0” if 
low-end or small businesses. The source for all these variables is MIX Market database. 
We also include a banking-regulation variable that is somewhat of a hybrid of MFI-level and 
national level. The variable BANK_REGULATION is the first principal component of two factors. The first 
factor is the principal component of six dummy variables that represents the country-level banking 
disclosure requirement by the regulators. These variables are: 1) Are banks required to prepare consolidated 
accounts for accounting purposes? 2) Are applicable accounting standards for banks in the country of 
operation prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP at the individual bank level? 3) Are applicable 
accounting standards for banks in the country of operation prepared in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) at the individual bank level? 4) Are all banks operating in the country 
(including foreign bank branches) required to make available to the public their annual financial statements 
at the individual bank level? 5) Do banks disclose to supervisors fully audited financial statements? 6) Are 
bank directors legally liable if the information disclosed is erroneous or misleading? These variables are 
from the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database of 2012. The second factor used in 
constructing BANK_REGULATION is whether the MFI is regulated by the local regulators within the 
country. It is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of “1” if the regulated field is marked yes and “0” 
if the field is marked no in the Mix Market database. This field is marked as yes if the MFI submits to some 
regulatory authority, whether a formal banking regulator or some other financial services regulator in the 
country of operation. 
3.4.3 Other country-level controls 
We include in our models a dummy variable that is assigned “1” if the country has a common-law 
legal origin and “0” otherwise (COMMON_LAW). In some testing (not reported in the tables), we also 
control for the national macroeconomic environment by including the natural logarithm of the gross 




the country where the MFI is based. This data is from the World Development Indicators. Additionally, 
following Gray (1988), we test our findings controlling for national culture.8 While not reported in the 
tables, we find little evidence that national culture, population density and wealth have little impact on the 
financial transparency of MFIs or on the role of profit status in determining transparency. 
4. Results 
4.1 Determinants of MFI transparency 
Table 3, reports on the regression models that focus on the determinants of transparency. Due to 
the nature of our dependent variable, which can take on values from 1–5 (MFI-years with diamond value 
of 0 dropped), we report the results of ordered logit regressions with errors clustered at the MFI level. 
In Model 1 we include only the variable FOR_PROFIT. This results in for-profit status being a 
significantly positive determinant of MFI transparency. In Model 2 we add MFI control variables. This 
results in OUTREACH_SIZE being significantly positive at 1%. This is consistent with Behn, DeVries, and 
Lin (2010) who find that transparency for nonprofits is positively associated with being a larger 
organization; although our sample is not just nonprofits but a sample of roughly half nonprofits and half 
for-profits. BANK_REGULATION is negatively significant at 1%. AGE is negatively significant at 10%; 
PORTFOLIO_QLTY is positively significant at 1%.9 The result for BANK_REGULATION suggests that 
MFI financial transparency is undertaken not as a result of required regulation but as a substitute for its 
lack. 
Model 3 adds independent variables for national governance and for English common law. This 
results in national governance being negatively significant at 1%. This is consistent with MFIs adopting 
transparency as a substitute for national governance. This result, that transparency is negatively related to 
national governance is further explored in the next section. Model 4 includes a term for the interaction of 
                                                 
8 In our tables, for the sake of clarity, we do not report some results of tests using a wider set of national variables. 
The results of these tests are available upon request. 
9 Not reported in the table, we also test the same set of independent variables as Model 2 but matching for-profit and 
nonprofit MFIs across the other independent variables using propensity score matching technique. This results in a 




profit status and national governance. This results in FOR_PROFIT*NATIONAL_ GOVERNANCE being 
positively significant at 1%. This result is consistent with improved national governance increasing the 
impact of profit status on transparency. 
While not reported in the tables, we also investigate the impact of other national-level variables, 
including GNI per capita, population density and national culture. The testing of national culture is 
motivated by Gray (1988), who suggest that the transparency of private firms is influenced by national 
culture. However, these additional national variables are not significant and inclusion of them in the set of 
independent variables makes little difference to the signs and significances of the coefficients of the other 
independent variables. 
(Please insert Table 3 about here) 
4.2 Dividing sample into for-profit and nonprofit MFIs 
In this section we present results of dividing the sample in for-profit and nonprofit MFIs in order 
to investigate the role of national governance on transparency. Table 4 reports the results of regressions that 
use the same set of independent variables as Table 3 Model 3. However, in Table 4 Models 1 and 2, the 
sample is divided according to profit status. This results in national governance being negatively significant 
only for nonprofit MFIs. In one sense our result of a negative association of national governance with 
financial transparency is consistent with Jacoby et al. (2019), while not consistent with Bushman, Piotroski, 
and Smith (2004). However, examining the results of dividing the sample between for-profits and 
nonprofits, as reported in Table 4, the negative association of governance and firm-level transparency is 
only significant for the sample of nonprofits. As Jacoby et al. (2019), Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) 
and others only investigate the association of firm-level transparency with national governance for a sample 
of for-profit firms, our results are not necessarily consistent or inconsistent with earlier research. 
Additionally, deposit taking is negatively significant only for nonprofits. On the other hand, bank regulation 




(Please insert Table 4 about here) 
4.2 The conditioning role of national governance and the parallel lines assumption 
We also investigate whether our models satisfy the parallel lines assumption (Brant, 1990). The 
parallel regression assumption (proportional regression assumption) in ordinal logistic regression says that 
the coefficients that describe the odds of being in the lowest category versus all higher categories of the 
response variable are the same as those that describe the odds between the second lowest category and all 
higher categories. In other words, if the coefficient on FOR_PROFIT in Model 4 of Table 3 is 0.58, can we 
infer that this coefficient is the consistently correct estimate for the increased odds of transitioning to each 
respective level? The results of Brant tests (not reported here) suggest it is not. The results of Brant tests 
suggest the parallel lines assumption is violated. Therefore, in subsequent models we present the same set 
of independent variables but with increasing restrictions on the level of our dependent variable. 
Model 1 is restricted to TRANSPARENCY not being 0 or 1; Model 2 is restricted to 
TRANSPARENCY not being 0, 1, or 2; and Model 3 is restricted to TRANSPARENCY not being 0, 1, 2 or 
3. Examining these results, it is clear that there are similarities across the models. Most particularly, 
FOR_PROFIT is positively significant. The coefficient on FOR_PROFIT increases across the models. This 
is consistent with the impact of for profit status on transparency being stronger for MFIs with higher levels 
of disclosure. A for-profit status is clearly more economically impacting on transparency for higher levels 
of transparency. National governance is negatively significant in Models 1 and 2 and not significant for 
Model 3. The interaction of profit status and national governance is positively significant in each of the 
models. Banking regulation is negatively significant across the models.  
 (Please insert Table 5 about here) 
4.3 Robustness testing: Two-stage procedure controlling for endogeneity 
In order to control for endogeneity we include robustness tests using the procedure of Kripfganz 




model, which first estimates the coefficients of the time-varying regressors and subsequently regresses the 
first-stage residuals on the time-invariant regressors.10 Kripfganz and Schwarz (2019) posit that this 
approach has advantages for avoiding model misspecification over estimating all coefficients 
simultaneously. The correct adjustment of the second-stage standard errors facilitates valid inference. These 
results are reported in Table 6. The results are substantially in agreement with the results of earlier tables, 
with the coefficient on FOR_PROFIT positively significant at 1%. One difference is that the coefficient on 
FOR_PROFIT (0.36) is a little smaller compared to earlier results. This suggests that when coefficients are 
adjusted for possible endogeneity, the economic significance of profit status is a little less than other testing 
suggests. 
(Please insert Table 6 about here) 
4.4 Discussion 
Overall, our results show that transparency is positively and significantly associated with for-profit 
status. FOR_PROFIT is positively significant at 1% or 5% level in every model. The coefficient, 
representing the increased likelihood of transitioning for a current level of transparency to the average of 
the remaining levels of transparency ranges across models, and for different base levels of transparency 
from 0.35 to 1.37. In summary, our results, over a variety of models and estimations, strongly suggest that 
for-profit firms in public goods supplying industry will be meaningfully more financially transparent. These 
results are interesting to consider alongside earlier research which finds that in environment of better 
transparency, for-profit firms will be more inclined toward market financing. In this paper, on the other 
hand, we determine that firms that use market financing, or have the option of using market financing, will 
elect for greater transparency.  
We also find that national governance is negatively significant, however this negative significance 
is not the case with regard to for-profit MFIs and for MFIs in general which maintain high levels of financial 
                                                 




transparency. We also evidence that improvement in national governance increases the impact of for-profit 
on financial transparency. 
Our results are consistent with managers of for-profits maintaining disclosure levels in order to 
satisfy shareholders. In contrast, results also suggest that pressure from donors of nonprofits is not always 
sufficient to engender comparable levels of disclosure. Certainly, there are reasons, common to nonprofits 
in general, not just nonprofit MFIs, that suggest that nonprofits under some circumstances may value a lack 
of transparency. As noted by Rose-Ackerman (1996), agency costs, particularly in the form of managerial 
shirking, may potentially be greater for nonprofits than for-profits as there is no market for corporate control 
with regard to nonprofits. Evidence suggests both for-profit and nonprofit MFIs do at times opt for 
particularly low levels of disclosure.  
We also find a positive association of transparency and outreach size. It is interesting to examine 
this result with regard to the model of Speckbacher (2008). Comparatively less transparency would be 
expected if the donors have already gained control rights. Mori and Mersland (2014) associate greater 
control rights of donors with smaller boards, which is typically concomitant with less outreach size 
(Hartarska (2005)). From this perspective, results are consistent with the nonprofit governance model of 
Speckbacher (2008), that nonprofits have greater transparency when they have larger outreach size with 
donors having less residual control rights. 
It is important to consider what the results say about for-profit business model providing 
transparency to microfinance and to nonprofits more generally. Do the results offer implications for the 
controversies outlined by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2009)? Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 
(2009) note that in particular for-profit MFIs are likely to charge higher interest rates than nonprofit MFIs. 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2009) also note the objections of important notable figures in the 
microfinance community, such as Muhammad Yunus11, who are sharply opposed to MFIs charging higher 
interest rates, viewing this as an economic exploitation of individuals at the bottom of the pyramid 
                                                 




(Prahalad, 2006). However, if higher rates provide a more sustainable business model, as many advocates 
of for-profit microfinance contend, then the providing by for-profit MFIs of greater financial transparency 
provides a valuable window to assess whether this is true. Our results suggest for-profit MFIs are more 
comfortable providing financial transparency compared with similar nonprofit firms. 
However, with regard to for-profit MFIs on the lower end of transparency, unlike MFIs at the higher 
end of transparency, our results do not support that for-profit MFIs provide greater transparency. Overall, 
whether results confirm that if the advent of more MFIs using a for-profit business model encourages 
disclosure, transparency and openness in the microfinance industry depends on what type of MFIs we are 
looking at. For MFIs with relatively higher levels of disclosure the answer is “yes.” For MFIs with lower 
levels of transparency the answer is “no.” Across countries, policy makers may wish to consider that for-
profit MFIs improve the governance environment for already well functioning microfinance industries, but 
do not improve microfinance industries that are as yet lacking in basic transparency and governance.  
As noted by Speckbacher (2008), Weisbrod (1975), Young (2011) and many others, there are 
commonalities with regard to public-good supplying industries compared to commercial enterprises in 
general. These include the need to prevent diversion of funds, the transaction costs of donors who seek 
control rights in the absence of reliable contracts, shareholder discipline and many other factors. In sum 
there is a commonality of environments across all industries that have both for-profit and nonprofit 
participants. Our results with regard to a broad sample of microfinance institutions across many countries 
should be of considerable interest with regard to nonprofits in general. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates how the difference between nonprofit and for-profit status impacts financial 
transparency of firms supplying public goods. Do levels of financial transparency differ between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations? How do country-level factors condition the role of profit status in impacting 
financial transparency? These questions deserve attention. However, there are particularly few industries 




is the microfinance industry, which has a large number of both for-profit and nonprofit firms in relatively 
equal numbers, across a number of countries. This allows for additionally investigating the role of national 
characteristics in conditioning the influence of profit status on financial transparency.  
A primary motive for our investigation is to consider this study in comparison to important papers 
from international finance that discuss markets versus relationship financing (Aggarwal and Goodell, 
2009a; Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009b; Ergungor, 2004; Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Goodell and Goyal, 
2018). While previous papers find that transparency at a national level leads to market financing being 
favored over relationship financing, this paper evidences that firms more likely to engage in market 
financing volitionally choose better levels of financial transparency. 
We evidence for a broad sample of microfinance institutions across many countries that financial 
transparency is positively associated with for-profit status. Similarly, improved levels of national 
governance enhance the role of for-profit status in promoting transparency. Results are robust to controlling 
for firm-level aspects of microfinance institutions and are consistent with financial transparency serving to 
safeguard against the greater likelihood amongst for-profit firms of diverting funds. Results will be of broad 
interest both to scholars interested in the roles of transparency and transaction costs on market versus 
relational financing; as well as to policy makers interested in the impact of for-profits on the supply of 
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Table 1: MFI transparency by country 
This table reports the country-level average transparency of MFIs, MFI-years, and total numbers of MFIs for the 
41 countries used in this study. MFI -level transparency, sourced from MIX Market, is assigned a discrete scalar 
value from 0–5, with 5 being the most transparent. However, MFI-years with transparency scores of 0 are dropped. 
We report the statistics for the full sample and for the for-profit and nonprofit MFIs used in this study. * indicates 
that there is no nonprofit MFI for Thailand in the sample. 










            
Panama 4.29 34 4 4.67 15 4.00 19 
Ecuador 4.03 413 58 4.53 86 3.90 327 
India 3.82 536 132 4.20 360 3.03 176 
Honduras 3.79 162 25 3.81 67 3.78 95 
Serbia 3.72 32 4 3.61 23 4.00 9 
El Salvador 3.64 121 15 3.74 61 3.55 60 
Guatemala 3.54 154 22 4.00 1 3.54 153 
Colombia 3.51 193 36 4.29 49 3.25 144 
Nepal 3.51 125 30 3.38 78 3.72 47 
Argentina 3.51 61 16 4.14 35 2.65 26 
South Africa 3.50 10 5 3.63 8 3.00 2 
Ukraine 3.50 12 2 1.00 2 4.00 10 
Kenya 3.46 65 16 3.47 45 3.45 20 
Nigeria 3.45 40 15 3.44 32 3.50 8 
Chile 3.39 28 7 4.07 15 2.62 13 
Mexico 3.37 315 69 3.51 269 2.57 46 
Pakistan 3.35 159 28 3.40 87 3.28 72 
China 3.26 27 6 3.00 12 3.47 15 
Bangladesh 3.25 182 35 4.88 24 3.01 158 
Dominican Rep. 3.23 56 10 2.54 24 3.75 32 
Brazil 3.05 128 35 2.89 27 3.09 101 
Peru 2.99 351 63 3.41 144 2.70 207 
Romania 2.97 37 7 2.75 28 3.67 9 
Jordan 2.96 55 8 3.00 6 2.96 49 
Lebanon 2.95 21 4 2.89 9 3.00 12 
Senegal 2.86 43 11 4.56 9 2.41 34 
Sri Lanka 2.65 62 20 3.00 42 1.90 20 
Malawi 2.61 23 5 3.00 5 2.50 18 
Indonesia 2.42 139 45 2.97 73 1.82 66 
Mozambique 2.40 42 8 2.40 15 2.41 27 
Zambia 2.35 17 6 1.73 11 3.50 6 
Bulgaria 2.28 88 22 2.64 11 2.23 77 
Ethiopia 2.25 76 16 2.22 59 2.35 17 
Tanzania 2.25 44 11 2.00 13 2.35 31 
Philippines 2.11 340 76 1.73 162 2.46 178 
Russia 2.05 165 56 2.45 29 1.96 136 
Burkina Faso 2.04 25 6 3.00 11 1.29 14 
Poland 1.92 13 3 2.33 9 1.00 4 
Sierra Leone 1.91 11 6 2.20 5 1.67 6 
Ghana 1.84 89 33 1.42 57 2.59 32 
Thailand 1.00 5 1 1.00 5 * * 
                




Table 2: Descriptive statistics and summary of data sources 
This table lists the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum, followed by definition and source of variables used in the regression analysis reported in Tables 3–5. We have 
an unbalanced panel data from 2003–2015 for 977 MFIs from 41countries for 4,499 MFI–year observations. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition and source of variables 
TRANSPARENCY 4,499 3.18 1.39 1.00 5.00 
Level of self-disclosure by a MFI annually. Transparency is assigned a discrete value of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, with 5 being most 
transparent. MFIs with T = 0 are dropped. Source: MIX Market. 
FOR_PROFIT 4,499 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 A dummy variable that is “1” if MFI is for-profit and “0” otherwise. Source: MIX Market.  
PROFITABILITY 4,499 –0.03 1.10 –38.28 3.96 
The first principal component score of the three annual MFI-level factors, that is, 1) return on equity, 2) return on assets, and 3) 
yield on the nominal gross portfolio. Source: MIX Market.  
PORTFOLIO_QLTY 4,499 0.00 0.99 –51.23 6.04 
The negative of the first principal component score of the four annual MFI-level factors: 1) loan portfolio at risk for 90 days or 
more, 2) the write-off ratio, 3) the negative of loan impairment provision divided by the gross loan portfolio, and 4) the negative of 
risk coverage, which is impairment loss allowance divided by the 30-day portfolio at risk. Source: MIX Market. 
EFFICIENCY 4,499 –0.09 1.29 –45.53 19.04 
The negative of the first principal component score of the four annual MFI-level factors, that is, 1) operating expense to loan 
portfolio, 2) cost per borrower, 3) number of borrowers per staff member, and 4) number of borrowers per loan officer. Source: 
MIX Market.  
LEVERAGE 4,499 6.56 32.81 0.000 1436.60 The annual MFI-level ratio of debt to equity. Source: MIX Market.  
AGE 4,499 1.67 0.61 0.000 2.00 
Categorical variable that is assigned 1 if the MFI is 1 to 4 years old, 2 if the MFI is 5 to 8 years old, and 3, if MFI is mature. Source: 
MIX Market (Note: this is how this variable is reported in MIX Market) 
OUTREACH_SIZE 4,499 0.92 0.87 0.00 2.00 
The degree of outreach. Outreach is assigned a discrete scalar value of 0, 1, or 2, with 2 the highest outreach among borrowers. 
Source: MIX Market. 
DEPOSITS 4,499 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 A dummy variable that is assigned 1 if MFI accept deposits and 0 otherwise. Source: MIX Market. 
TARGET 4,499 0.45 0.50 0.000 1.00 
A dummy variable equal to “1” if the borrowers of the MFI are a high-end or broad business and “0” if a low-end or small business. 
Source: MIX Market. 
BANK_REGULATION 4,499 –0.21 0.95 –2.17 1.76 
This is a variable created for this paper as the principal component of two different measures. 
The first measure is principal component score of six dummy variables that represent country-level banking regulation: 1) Are banks 
required to prepare consolidated accounts for accounting purposes? 2) Are applicable accounting standards for banks in country of 
operation prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP at the individual bank level? 3) Are applicable accounting standards for banks 
in country of operation prepared in accordance with IFRS at the individual bank level? 4) Are all banks operating in the country 
(including foreign bank branches) required to make available to the public their annual financial statements at the individual bank 
level? 5) Do banks disclose to supervisors fully audited financial statements? 6) Are bank directors legally liable if the information 
disclosed is erroneous or misleading? Source: Bank Regulation and Supervision, 2012, World Bank. 
The second measure is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of “1” if the Regulated field is marked yes and “0” if the field is 
marked no in the mixmarket.org database. This field is marked as yes if the MFI submits to some regulatory authority, whether a 
formal banking regulator or some other financial services regulator. Source: MIX Market.  
COMMON_LAW 4,499 0.32 0.47 0 1 Dummy variable that is assigned “1” if country has an English legal origin and “0” otherwise 
NATIONAL_ 
GOVERNANCE 
4,499 0.44 1.78 –3.31 9.53 
The first principal component score of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank - Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 




Table 3: Association of profit status and MFI transparency: Controlling for country-level factors 
This table shows the results of ordered logit regressions with standard errors clustered by MFI, for an unbalanced panel data of 977 MFIs for a period from 
2003–2015. The dependent variable, TRANSPARENCY, can take on a discrete value from 1–5. P-values are in parentheses below the coefficient values. For 
explanation of the variables used in the regressions models, see Table 2. We control for year fixed effects in all the regression models. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes 













Table 4: Examining country-level factors with separate samples of for-profit and nonprofit MFIs 
This table shows the results of ordered logit regressions with standard errors clustered by MFI, for an unbalanced panel 
data of 977 MFIs for a period from 2003–2015. The dependent variable, TRANSPARENCY, can take on a discrete value 
from 1–5. P-values are in parentheses below the coefficient values. For explanation of the variables used in the 
regressions models, see Table 2. We control for year fixed effects in all the regression models. ***, **, * indicates 






























































   
YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes 
Observations 2,023 2,476 








Table 5: Excluding levels of transparency 
This table shows the results of ordered logit regressions with standard errors clustered by MFI, for an unbalanced panel data of 977 MFIs for a 
period from 2003–2015. The dependent variable, TRANSPARENCY, can take on a discrete value from 1–5. P-values are in parentheses below the 
coefficient values. For explanation of the variables used in the regressions models, see Table 2. We control for year fixed effects in all the regression 











































































































YEAR DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes 












Table 6: Association of profit status and MFI transparency: Controlling for endogeneity 
This table shows the results of tests with the 2-stage procedure of Kripfganz and Schwarz (2019), for an unbalanced panel data of 977 
MFIs for a period from 2003–2015. The dependent variable, TRANSPARENCY, can take on a discrete value from 1–5. P-values are in 
parentheses below the coefficient values. For explanation of the variables used in the regression models, see Table 2. ***, **, * indicates 
















































Appendix: Pearson correlation coefficients 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 TRANSPARENCY 1.00 


































































































































1.00   
12 NATIONAL_GOVERNANCE 
–0.05*** 
(0.001) 
0.13 
(0.000) 
–0.02 
(0.168) 
–0.18 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.799) 
–0.01 
(0.490) 
–0.05 
(0.001) 
–0.27*** 
(0.000) 
–0.01 
(0.406) 
–0.13*** 
(0.000) 
–0.16*** 
(0.000) 
1.00  
13 COMMON_LAW 
0.05*** 
(0.001) 
0.17*** 
(0.000) 
0.03** 
(0.043) 
0.07*** 
(0.000) 
–0.19*** 
(0.000) 
0.05*** 
(0.000) 
–0.13*** 
(0.000) 
0.08*** 
(0.000) 
0.37*** 
(0.000) 
–0.24*** 
(0.000) 
0.28*** 
(0.000) 
–0.19*** 
(0.000) 
1.00 
 
